Showing posts with label Blue Team. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Blue Team. Show all posts

Thursday, May 5, 2016

PCDC 2016 RE Challenge Solutions - Part 2

This is a continuation off of my previous post detailing the solutions to the 2016 PCDC reverse engineering challenges 1 and 2. This post will go over the solutions for challenges 3 and 4. If you were a competitor in this year's PCDC competition, you may not have seen all of the RE challenges. Challenges 1 and 2 were made for high school students, challenge 3 was added for college students, and challenge 4 was added for professional day. As a result, only the professionals saw all 4 challenges. This was designed to help balance expected work load during the competition and provide increasing level so difficulty for increasing levels of skill. So let's look at the remaining two challenge solutions.

Challenge 3 - exclusive

Like with all the other challenges, let's run this one and get an idea of what it does.


So this looks a little bit like our previous challenges where we have to give it a valid input and it well tell us if that input is correct and print out the key. Let's open the challenge up in Immunity and take a look. 


After loading the binary and analyzing the modules just like the we did in the previous challenge, we can scroll down and see the instructions responsible for printing out the initial user prompt. We can also see how our input gets read into the program via the call to fgets(). The important thing to note how fgets() gets its parameters. In x86-32 bit assembly on Windows, which is what we are looking at, these parameters are passed on the stack in a standard called CDECL (C declaration). What this means is the PUSH instructions are actually setting up the parameters to the fgets() function. To understand what these parameters are, let's look at this function.

Using MSDN as a resource, we can see that fgets() has the following signature:

char *fgets(char *str, int n, FILE *stream);

What this function is doing is reading in an n byte string, storing it in a memory buffer pointed to by str, and reading the input from the file stream stream. If you look at Immunity, it even tells you which PUSH instruction is responsible for setting up which parameter to the fgets() call and in this case, it tells you it is reading a string of length 0x16 (n = 16 (22.)). Now for our purposes, the important parameter to consider is the address where this user defined input gets stored. If you looked at the link specifying the CDECL calling convention, you'll see that the first parameter listed in the function (char *str) is the last one pushed onto that stack before the call to fgets(). We don't need to understand all the instructions, we just need to see the use of DWORD PTR SS:[EBP-34]. This is going to be a pointer to where our input will be stored. If we look through the disassembly a little more, we should see this address show up again. Specifically in the 0x00401397 - 0x004013CE address range. Before we go any further, lets recap what we know:

- The program expects to get a 'serial number' which it then validates
- The program uses a call to fgets() to read in our input
- Our input is stored at DWORD PTR SS:[EBP-34]
- We see our stored address used within the assembly address range 0x00401397 0x004013CE

Now it's time to verify these. The best way to do this with a debugger is to set break points. At this point, right-click on the address 0x00401397, go down to breakpoints and select toggle. Alternatively, click on the address and press F2 to toggle the breakpoint. This is after we have entered the string to the program and before it looks like it's getting used.  With the breakpoint turned on, our program will halt at that address when execution has gotten there. So with our breakpoint set, let's run the program. This can be done 3 different ways: 1. Press F9, 2. To to the top menu and press the red play button, 3. Go to Debug -> Run. The first thing that will happen is that the program will break at what is called the program entry point. This is basically the API the program exposes to the OS so that the program can start up. There are a lot of steps that go into getting from this point to the break point we set, but we don't care about those at this time. Just press F9 again to continue. Now at this point, you should see the Windows command window. It should be waiting for you to enter in your input. Go ahead and enter is some string into this window like you did the first time you ran this challenge program.



At this point it will look like your program hangs, but this is Immunity pausing it so you can being to dive deeper into the details of what's going on. Let's analyze the following snippet of code:



If we look at the first instruction, we see a CMP to 0x16. Remember from the first post that CMP is used to make comparisons and remember from earlier in this post, that this challenge reads in a 0x16 byte string. Now look at the second instruction, JNB SHORT exclusiv.004013D0. It is a jump instruction to the address 0x004013D0. That target address is interesting, but not as interesting as the instruction before it at address 0x004013CE, a JMP SHORT exclusive.00401397. That's the same address we set our breakpoint at! This is a loop! We compare some counter to 0x22, if it is less than 0x22, continue execution, otherwise, jump. It kind of looks like:

int x = 0;
while (x < 0x16) {
    loop_body();
}

Now we haven't figured out the loop body yet. But let's step through this an instruction at a time by pressing the F7 key and stop when we get to address 0x004013A5, the first XOR instruction. If you're following along with my example and entered in abcd1234 as your string to test, you should see something like this:


Now I've added some circles to draw your attention to a few places. So the instruction we stopped at is XOR EAX, 9C. This means we are performing the XOR operations on whatever value is in the EAX register with the hex value 0x9C. I've circled the EAX register, and we can see the value of 0x61. If you recall, our input string was abcd1234, the hexadecimal value for the ASCII character 'a' is 0x61. Interesting. Let's continue to the next XOR instruction at 0x004013B9.


Again, I've highlighted the value in the EAX register, 0x62 (ASCII value for 'b'), and the other value in the XOR operation is 0xDC. If you continue to step through, you'll see that we jump back to address 0x00401397, and loop through these series of instructions again. When you inspect the EAX register, you'll see the values 0x63 and 0x64 (ASCII 'c' and 'd' respectively). It is indeed our input string. Now, we know we are in a loop. In fact, we wrote out some pseudo-code for it. So let's update it a little:

int x = 0;
while (x < 0x16) {
   input[i] ^ 0x9C;
   input[i+1] ^ 0xDC;
   x++;
}

Hmmm this doesn't seem quite right. So how is our loop being incremented and how to we know our index for our input? Let's looks at the following details:

What we're looking at is how the input string is indexed using the EDX register, and how that register is incremented by 2 every loop iteration. So let's refine our code a little more:

int x = 0;
while (x < 0x16) {
   input[i] ^ 0x9C;
   input[i+1] ^ 0xDC;
   x += 2;
}

Great. Now when we exit our loop, our input has been XOR'ed with the key 0x9CDC. A little further down we see a call to the function memcmp(). Here is the MSDN documentation for that function. What it does is look to see if 2 memory regions contain the same data for a given number of bytes. Again, Immunity has done some work for us and shows us that this memcmp() is using 2 pointers, s1 and s2, and comparing them up to 0x15 (21) bytes. Le't set a breakpoint at address 0x004013DA where memcmp() gets called. So, by looking at the previous instructions and what we learned from the loop we reverse engineered, we see that s2 is the string we entered after it has been XOR'ed. A good way to confirm this is we see that the address of this string got loaded into the EAX register with the instruction at address 0x004013D2. So what we can do is right-click on the EAX register and click Follow in Dump. This will show a hex dump of our data:


And indeed, those are our input bytes after being XOR'ed. Check the first 2 bytes; 0x6162 XOR 0x9CDC = 0xFDBE. So what we are really interested in is the memory contents of the second pointer, s1, being used in the memcmp(). We can find that by doing the same thing we did in the previous step, but with the ECX register. So let's get the contents of that dump.


This this is ultimately our goal. The 0x15 (21) bytes of this memory segment. This is what our input string gets compared to after being XOR'ed against the key 0x9CDC. So now let's update our pseudo-code:

char serial[0x15] = "\xff\xbd\xfa\xb9\xb1\xec\xad\xee\xaf\xe8\xb1\xe9\xaa\xeb\xa4\xe5\xb1\xbe\xf9\xb9\xfa"
char *input = (char *)malloc(0x16);
fgets(input, 0x16, STDIN);

int x = 0;
while (x < 0x16) {
 input[i] ^ 0x9C;
   input[i+1] ^ 0xDC;
   x += 2;
}

if (memcmp(key, input, 0x15) == 0) {
    win();
} else {
    fail();
}

Now, we know this is what happens with the memcmp() function by reading the documentation and seeing the TEST EAX, EAX instruction and seeing successful jumps over the failure messages. So the only thing left to do is solve what the input string is. If you read the documentation on XOR, you know that it is reversible. So all we have to do is XOR our serial we dumped out of memory with the key of 0x9CDC. There are plenty of online tools to do this for you. Once you do it, you'll find that the input should be: cafe-01234-56789-beef. Let's give this a try.



Success!

Password: cafe-01234-56789-beef
Flag: FLAG{XOR_Encryption_Is_Super_Safe!!!}

Challenge 4 - hashbrowns

This challenge was made specifically for the competition on professional day. As such, I'm going to assume a slightly more advanced level of readership. The last challenge solution really went in depth by stepping through the explanation. This solution write-up isn't going to go into as much detail describing how a particular section of code does something. Instead, it will be left up to the reader to figure out all the details.

So let's start by running this program like we did the ones before it.



Ok. So we are given a hash and we have to find the input that matches this hash. So the way we do this is we need to find the hashing algorithm. Opening up the executable in Immunity, we should see the following:


So with this challenge, we see that there are a couple of internal functions with the CALL instructions to addresses within the hashbrowns executable image. Notably, these can be seen at 0x00401442 and 0x00401471. Let's look at the first function starting at address 0x00401310 by right-clicking on the address and choosing the follow option.



I've gone ahead and annotated the interested aspects of this function. The first is that this is a loop and we see a call to strlen() in the loop. This leads us to believe that we are looping through a string for the length of a string. The other interesting pieces of information about this loop are the CMP instructions. We see each of them circled in the above picture and each comparison is to a hex value. The four values, 0x41, 0x5A, 0x61, and 0x7A correspond to the ASCII characters 'A', 'Z', 'a', and 'z' respectively. This loop looks like it is looking for upper and lowercase alphabetical characters. We can further confirm this by analyzing the string argument to the printf() call at 0x00401453, "Found a character I can't hash." This clue would indicate that the program only accepts alphabetical characters. Let's test this hypothesis.


We have confirmed our hypothesis. Let's move onto the next internal function at 0x00401390. Here is a picture of that function.



So again we can see can see we are looping through the length of the string character by character. This is in-fact the function that performs the hashing function. Now, there were a few ways to solve this. The difficult way was to manually reverse engineer the actual algorithm represented by the instructions at addresses 0x004013C3 - 0x004013D7, or, look at the value 0x1505 and do some research on hashing algorithms. If you convert 0x1505 to decimal, you get 5381. A Google search with the keywords hash and 5381 should lead you directly to the DJB2 hashing algorithm. Here is what that algorithm looks like.
unsigned long djb2(unsigned char *str){
        unsigned long hash = 5381;
        int c;
        while (c = *str++)
            hash = ((hash << 5) + hash) + c; 

        return hash;
}

When looking at this algorithm, we see the constant 0x1505 and the shift left 5 (SHL EDX, 5). Now we need to make sure this is actually what were after. Going back to the main part of our challenge, we see the following section of code.


What we see here is a call to our hashing function at 0x00401390 then a series of CMP instructions. Interestingly we see a CMP  to a value of 0x28C7FAE4 which is the hash value the challenge asked us to match. If we look at it a little further, we can see that this CMP instruction calls a JMP to a unique address not jumped to by any other CMP instruction. So these are the pieces we have so far:

  • The input expects a string input that will be hashed
  • That string gets hashed through the DJB2 hashing algorithm
  • The result of the hash must match 0x28C7FAE4
The way to solve this is to write a brute force script that enumerates through alphabetical strings and hashes them using the DJB2 hashing algorithm until a match is found with the value 0x28C7FAE4

This is what the DJB2 algorithm looks like in Python.

def djb2(string):
    hash = 5381
    for x in string:
        hash = (( hash << 5) + hash) + ord(x)
    return hash & 0xFFFFFFFF

The best way to solve this is to actually use a password list. Using the rock-you password list and a python script based on the previous snippet of code, you would have found that the hash value matches the input string of cyberdragoon. Here is the proof.



So here is the summary for RE challenge 4:
Password: cyberdragoon
Flag: FLAG{alls_good_when_the_hashing_is_easy}


Conclusion

I hope this year introduced an interesting new twist on the PCDC injects. If you're interested in working through the challenges on your own, I've put the executables on my GitHub account here. As always, I'm always interested in hearing feedback, so if you have anything you'd like to see improved for next year, don't hesitate to let me know. See you in 2017!





Sunday, May 31, 2015

Palmetto Cyber Defense Competition - 2015

Last month my fellow employees and I wrapped up our third annual Palmetto Cyber Defense Competition (PCDC). Inspired by the Collegiate Cyber Defense Competitions, PCDC has been a computer security competition for high schools and colleges in South Carolina. I've written about the event itself in the past PCDC-2014 so I won't go into detail about what the event actually is. Those details can be found at the official PCDC site. Instead I wanted to focus on a couple of the things that make PCDC unique, lessons learned from putting on a computer security competition, and where we are going in the future. For those of you looking for a detailed Red Team write up, that can be found here. I took the time after the competition to create an in-depth analysis of the Red Team's process for those looking to learn from their mistakes at this year's competition. The rest of this blog post is a few of my thoughts from an organizer's perspective and not from the perspective of the Red Team lead.

First off, PCDC is unique in that for the first two years, both high schools and colleges competed. Each group had their own dedicated competition day which meant that the PCDC competition was actually run twice. This means that after the first day, all the machines must get reset, re-imaged, and configured slightly different for the next day. This year, we had a third day added; a professional day. For the first time, PCDC was to be run three times. The schedule of events was as follows: first day was high school, second day was college, and the third day was for professionals. For the professional day, we had groups representing a mixture of government and private industry. From the government side teams were comprised of members from the 24th Air Force and U.S. Cyber Command while the industry teams had members from Scientific Research Corporation (SRC), and SPARC. All in all, we had 4 government teams and 4 teams from industry.

Our goal from the beginning was to design the competition network to be believable and realistic. Since it was not known to us during the planning and design phase of the competition that there would be a professional day, this year's theme was based around an online game development company. Each of the Blue Teams would be responsible for making sure their development company continued to function through the course of the day and deliver the latest version of their game to their user base through audience accessible tablets connected to each Blue Team via a dedicated wireless connection. One of the things that we quickly realized was that our ambitions greatly eclipsed the amount of time we had available to create the network. Remember, a decent portion of our time goes into infrastructure development so that the competition can be rerun the next day. To add to that pressure, we do not have control over the facility in which the competition is hosted. As a result, or preparation time from the end of one day the beginning of the next is usually around 3 hours.

To put it simply, there was a lot of different attributes that we wanted to include into this year's competition, but we ran out of time. One of the biggest things we feel these types of competition lack when trying to simulate real world networks is realistic user activity. This year we attempted to remedy that by developing simulated users. We got all the code developed and tested for the user simulators, but due to a hardware failure, we were unable to deploy them to the competition network this year. In the interest of education and sharing, I have opened sourced the code for the user simulators on GitHub. We'd really like to hear back from anyone that is doing something similar.

A few of us have been involved in multiple CCDCs and PCDCs and every year, we make the comment that the scoring system needs to be altered. Although this was in the works before this year's competition even took place, we haven't had time to finalize what fixing the scoring means. At this point, I think we have a much better idea of how we are going to fix the scoring. To highlight why scoring is such an issue, I want to talk about how winning Blue Teams typically approach this competition. Within the first few minutes, the strategy includes removing all unnecessary accounts, changing all the default passwords, and for some, unplugging their entire network while they continue to harden. Now, from a strategic perspective with the goal to win a game in mind, I can't argue with this approach. The issue that I do have, however, is that this leaves the networks in a pretty unrealistic state.

Each Blue Team is given an information packet at the beginning of the competition. In that packet includes the names of the accounts that the automated scoring engine will use to log into their systems and perform service checks to make sure the Blue Teams still have their services up and running. Once these account names have been identified, the Blue Teams will delete every other account off the workstation or server. This means you could have 3 or 4 domain joined Windows workstations with zero user accounts and only the scoring engine account. It is important to note, that the Red Team is not allowed to leverage the scoring engine account to gain access to the Blue Team's networks. It's also not realistic. A computer security competition should force the students and competitors to perform real security tasks with the presence of real users. Now, since this is a competition and getting that many unbiased volunteer users is unrealistic, we need simulated users.

Other areas where improvements to scoring need to be made is in the way the scoring engine actually evaluates successful checks. Up to this point, a common service to check for is a functioning MySQL database. Typically the scoring engine will login to the MySQL database, make a query, and check for a specific key-value pair or for the presence of a specific table. This simply isn't good enough. For a real company, the database needs to have constant transactions generated by realistic activity. Right now, Blue Teams get away with making a backup of the database in the beginning of the day and just restoring it anytime the Red Team deletes the database. As long as the Blue Team restores the database in between scoring engine rounds, the scoring engine gives that Blue Team a perfect service check score. Now, this is slightly cured by the fact that the Red Team reports incidents to the Gold Team and the Gold Team can decide to take away points, but these types of scenarios need to have bigger impact on the 'day to day' operations of the Blue Teams' networks.

Where we plan to go in the future will attempt to combine 3 facets of scoring. The first being financial. The scoring engine will no longer add points, but will score the Blue Teams' companies in a financial sense. The second facet is from an internal employee and systems perspective. Employees must be able to perform their job related duties and interdependent systems must be able to communicate with each other. Finally, the third facet is from the Red Team. This year we tried something new by giving the Red Team specific targets/flags to capture when we gained access to the the Blue Teams' networks. This included the credit card numbers in their customer database, the source code to their latest game, and a few other  things.

Now, I know some people will argue that the CCDCs and even PCDC already take these things into consideration with the scoring engine, but we argue, it is not taken into account enough. The example we like to use is the one where the Blue Team unplugs their network. Now sure, they aren't getting any points from the scoring engine, but in the real world, you can't just go and unplug your entire company from the network. Not only would you be losing sales, but you're paying your employees to do a job that they can't accomplish. And not to mention, the security or IT department has no authority to make that type of decision.

We have thought long and hard about the scoring and we think we have something new and exciting for next year. I don't want to give away too much here until things are more settled. Additionally, we want to find a way to make the audience understand what is going on. PCDC is free and open for the community to come in and view. This year we attempted to show what was taking place by visualizing the the traffic between the Blue Teams and Red Team in real time. I wrote the code for this and am also releasing it on  GitHub. You can see a video demo of it on YouTube.

We have a lot of exciting things planned for next year's PCDC! Stay tuned for more, and if you have any feedback from this year's we'd love to hear it.

Wednesday, April 15, 2015

South East Regional CCDC 2015 - Red Team

This time last week I wrapped up Red Teaming for the South East regional Collegiate Cyber Defense Competition (SECCDC) for 2015. The SECCDC is special for me for a few reasons. It was my first exposure to the whole CCDC arena, many of my close friends form the Red Team, and the CCDC national champs from last year are from this region.

This year's scenario was similar to last year's. The Blue Teams were responsible for maintaining the operational status of the HAL business network while completing a series of business related injects. The network layout changed a bit from last year, however. This year all the Blue Teams had a few machines that were public facing, and a group of privately networked workstations. The public facing images were comprised of a pfSense software firewall, 2 SuSe Linux boxes, and a Windows 2012 R2 server. The SuSe boxes were used for backup DNS, MySQL database, and the e-commerce web server while the Windows box was primarily performing the normal functions of Domain Controller and primary DNS.

After scanning the networks, we quickly determined that the Blue Teams were running all of their public facing services off of an ESXi server. Additional investigation revealed that the ESXi servers were version 5.5.0 and vulnerable to Heartbleed. This vulnerability became our primary attack vector. By leveraging Heartbleed, we could force the ESXi servers to leak the login credentials in clear-text whenever the Blue Teams logged in. Once gaining root access to the ESXi servers, my goal was to gain access to the domain controller. This is a little tricky when you want to go unnoticed. We were able to jump on a couple of domain controllers that Blue Teams logged into, but left the console open and unattended. The Linux boxes were much easier to compromise. Either they were logged into as root and we could change the password, add users, start SSH, lock the console, and log in remotely, or, we reboot the machine into single user mode, changed the root password, and rebooted. Finally, by leveraging a combination of default credentials and unattended console sessions, we leveraged the pfSense firewalls to lock the Blue Teams out of their networks by turning off the internal interface, but allowed us in via the external interface.

Throughout the course of the competition, the Blue Teams started to slowly kick us out of their networks. This forced us to start getting more creative with our access methods. The first area we looked at was the WordPress site running the e-commerce server. Although we couldn't take advantage of any vulnerable plugins, we could take advantage of the fact that the WordPress configuration let anyone register an account. Now, registering an account in and of itself isn't exciting, but what is exciting, is the fact that WordPress emails you your password. This is important because we had read/write access to the MySQL database backend of WordPress. In the database we could clearly see the administrator's hashed password. Now that we created our own user, we could also see our hashed password in the database. The next step was just receiving the password generated by WordPress. With the Blue Team's network configuration, the WordPress instance couldn't email out to a public email address. But what it could do, was pass the email along to a local Python SMTP server that we controlled. During the user account creation process, we simply specified our email address as 'user@<ipaddress>' rather than providing a public domain name. This worked like a charm. Now that we had a clear-text password and a corresponding WordPress password hash, we leveraged our read/write access to the MySQL database to overwrite the administrator's password hash. Now we could log into the WordPress administrator's account with a password that we knew.

Our other attack vector was actually found by digging through the pfSense source code. For a few of the teams we still had authentication access to the firewalls, but the web administration had been shutoff. It turns out that there is an XML RPC in pfSense. Like I said, we had the username and password, but couldn't turn on the web console and not all the routers had SSH enabled. So we created our own shell. Using the XML RPC and a little PHP voodoo, we pulled down a PHP shell and created our own web console. In most of the Red Team's opinion, this was one of our coolest finds of the event.

One of the largest differences I noticed this year was how a couple of Blue Teams were able to almost completely block out the Red Team. The teams that were quick to correctly configure their routers and whitelists on their ESXi servers removed the largest holes in their network, and their service scores showed it. As a Red Team we really took advantage of Heartbleed and default pfSense credentials. Without those footholds, we weren't able to really do much. Smaller attack surfaces seemed to be a trend for a few of the CCDC regional events this year. My previous blog post talked about how at the Pacific Rim regional, the Red Team really only had 2 targets, and the vulnerabilities were default credentials. This was definitely not the case for South East, but the Red Team definitely noticed a lack of attack surface. I've been talking to a lot of people about some of these observations and we all agree that we want modern systems and network configurations, but how do you open up the attack surface without making it unrealistic?

All in all, I had an absolute blast at SECCDC. I'm already looking forward to next year. I know all the organizers of the SECCDC work incredibly hard to put on this event every year. Their efforts have been noticed and I thank them for all the time and effort they put forth to make this event a reality. And congratulations to UCF for winning a second year and a row! Good luck at Nationals and bring keep the championship in the South East!!

Tuesday, March 31, 2015

Pacific Rim Regional CCDC 2015 - Red Team

A week and a half ago I got to participate in the 2015 Pacific Rim (Pac-Rim) Collegiate Cyber Defense Competition as a member of the Red Team. My more experienced friend Dan has already written a couple of posts about this season's CCDC events (lockboxx) including Pac-Rim. I wanted to use this post not to talk about what I did as a member of the Red Team, but my developing opinions of CCDC and these types of "cyber defense" competitions.

To give context to this post, I'll give a brief description of Pac-Rim's scenario. The Blue Teams were tasked as the IT/Security department of The Center for Disease Control (CDC) while the world experienced a zombie outbreak. While trying the manage their network, they must also address the growing scare of zombies and how that impacted their jobs at the CDC.

As far as network design, the Blue Teams were given an external/public facing network, and a couple of internal networks with varying security levels. From the Red Team perspective we saw 3 primary targets, a VyOS router (VyOS), a Windows 2012 R2 exchange server, and a Fedora 20 web server. Initial scans for vulnerabilities turned up very little. These were pretty modern systems that weren't running a lot of services. Not a lot to attack. The VyOS router did have port forwarding rules set to proxy through connections to servers on the internal network. With this we could see a couple of services beyond the router such as MySQL. For the Red Team, the only way we actually got access to any of these machines was by default credentials.

Leaving default credentials is such a silly thing for Blue Teams to pass up and it is such an easy vector for Red Teams to leverage. Default credentials are usually the very first thing Blue Teams change. That being said, once default credentials have been changed, the Red Team has to be more cunning to find another way into the Blue Team's networks. Unfortunately, for the Pac-Rim event, it seemed that more than half of the teams separated themselves because they changed their passwords quicker than the other teams. I want to focus on this point a little bit more.

When I say that a Blue Team was quicker in changing their default password, I mean they were quicker by a minute, to seconds. This year, we split the Red Team up into cells. Each cell was tasked with attacking a specific Blue Team for the duration of the event. Each cell was to stay in sync with all the other Red Team cells. This sounds like a great concept because it seems very fair. And I agree that it is fair in theory. The issue you run into is the very opening few minutes. This entire event was determined by the first five minutes. The Blue Teams that changed their passwords on the Win2012 Exchange server before their router did better than the students that changed their router's password first. The reason being that the Win2012 Exchange server could be used to pivot all around the internal domain. The router did not provide this type of access. We even had a couple of teams that changed both the router and Exchange server passwords extremely quickly. The result, the Red Team really couldn't do much to them. Now, this isn't meant to be a Red Team sob story. I love when the students lock the Red Team out. That means they are learning, and they are equipped with the skills to make our industry safer. That to me is an amazing thing. The issue I have is that changing 2 default passwords and locking the Red Team out for a day and half is not a learning experience. Further more, since all the Red Team cells are staying in-sync with each other, A Blue Team could get away with leaving a gaping whole in their systems as long as the Red Team cells weren't attacking that particular issue at that time.

The primary point of CCDC is to provide the students with a unique learning experience that they will never get in the class room. At the end of the competition, I got to sit down with the Blue Team I attacked all weekend. They were so full of questions and eager to learn from their experience. The problem was, I couldn't answer all of their questions. Due to a scheduling issue, I had to work alone as a Red Team cell so my focus was extremely stretched. My Blue Team changed their Exchange server password right away and I never got access to it. I only got access to their router and MySQL database. Since most of the Blue Teams' networks was comprised of a majority of Windows systems, I was asked a lot of questions regarding how well they did configuring the workstations, domains, and other Windows related services. Unfortunately I had to tell them that because they changed 1 default password, I wasn't able to give them an accurate perspective. They could have had a terribly configured domain. I wouldn't know. And this was the case for a lot of Blue Teams. They simply didn't get all the feed back that the Red Team could have provided had there been more access.

I go back to the point that CCDC is suppose to be a learning experience. It's hard to find the balance between giving the students unrealistically insecure systems that the Red Team can stomp all over, and modern secure systems where the Red Team still has decent access. I also want to emphasize the point of these competitions is to focus on cyber security. One of my Blue Team members told me that they spent the entire first day (more than 8 hours) dealing with customer phone calls from the Orange Team. What?! Customer service has very little to do with developing cyber security skills. I understand that the Orange Team is there to act as real world customers, but this is a competition. Blue Teams are obviously going to put their best 'people person' on the phone. They probably won't learn anything in terms of how to deal with people and they'll miss out on the actual technical education.

In the end if my Blue Team was able to learn 1 thing, than in my opinion, the experience was worth it. I love doing these types of events as a way to connect with students and provide guidance in a way that it was provided to me. Next week I'll be participating in the South East CCDC regional and my company's own cyber defense competition (PCDC) so I should have a lot more stuff to report on.